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THE LIMITS OF ADVOCACY: OCCUPATIONAL
HAZARDS IN JUVENILE COURT *
ANTHONY PLATT t AND R-UTH FRIEDMAN I
INTRODUCTION
This study in legal sociology examines the role played by private
attorneys defending youthful offenders in Chicago's juvenile court.
Until recent legislative and judicial reforms were implemented, juvenile
courts were administered like welfare tribunals: due process was
virtually ignored and defense lawyers were discouraged from par-
ticipating in the proceedings. Attempts are currently under way to
"legalize" juvenile court by requiring the presence of counsel and the
observance of due process requirements.' This article presents a
qualitative analysis of defense work in juvenile court from the per-
spective of lawyers who recently represented juvenile clients in an
urban jurisdiction.
Studies of delinquency have for the most part focused on its
psychological and environmental origins. There is a considerable
amount of information concerning the social context of delinquency,
the economic inequalities in American life which purportedly motivate
illegal behavior, and the subcultural organization of youth gangs.' But
there are few reported studies on the social and judicial processes by
which young people are formally denominated criminals or de-
linquents. 3 Social scientists interested in crime and delinquency have
for the most part focused on criminal actors and neglected the relevant
criminal law and its administration.4 During this century, there have
been only sporadic efforts in criminological research on the socio-legal
* The research for this article was supported by the Center for Studies in Criminal
Justice, University of Chicago. We are grateful to our colleagues at the Center-
particularly Gordon Hawkins, Hans W. Mattick, and Norval Morris-for their critical
comments on an earlier draft of this article.
t Research Fellow, Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, University of Chicago.
B.A. (Law) 1963, Oxford University. D. Crim. 1966, University of California.
* Research Assistant, Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, University of
Chicago. A.B. 1966, University of California.
I E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2 See, e.g., R. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY & OPPORTUNITY (1960);
A. COHEN, DELINQUENT BOYS (1955); C. SHAW & H. McKAY, JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY AND URBAN AREAS (1942); THE SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
(M. Wolfgang, L. Savitz & N. Johnston ed. 1962) ; Miller, Lower Class Culture as a
Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency, 14 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 5-19 (1958).
3 One of the few such studies is H. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY
OF DEVIANCE (1966).
4 Jeffrey, The Historical Development of Criminology, in PIONEERS IN CRIMI-
NOLOGY 364 (H. Mannheim ed. 1960).
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problems involved in governmental invasion of personal liberty.
Francis Allen suggests that the historical development and positivistic
bias of academic criminology account for this trend:
It is not too much to say that a great part of the criminological
labors of the last half-century proceeded with little considera-
tion of the political and ethical values which are inevitably
involved. . . . Mistaken or malevolent uses of state power
have rarely been considered as possibilities demanding
measures or concern. Unfortunately, the history of recent
years has demonstrated all too clearly that the criminal law
and its sanctions are capable of use as instruments for the
destruction of basic political values and, in the world as a
whole, the malevolent use of state power has become rather
the rule than the exception. Accordingly, the realization has
grown steadily that the values of legality and equality at the
hands of the state are the essence of a free community and
that the substantive criminal law has a major contribution
to make in their preservation.'
The rehabilitative ideal has so dominated American criminology
that research is usually undertaken in order to fix the origins of
criminal and delinquent behavior within particular individuals or
environments rather than in the officially constituted agencies of the
criminal law. But as Allen has observed, "[e]ven if one's interests lie
primarily in the problems of treatment of offenders, it should be
recognized that the existence of the criminal presupposes a crime and
that problems of treatment are derivative in the sense that they depend
upon the determination by law-giving agencies that certain sorts of
behavior are crimes." 6
If one cares why young persons become delinquents, it is
important to understand the conditions under which juveniles are
formally declared delinquent. It is a well-documented fact that violation
of the law does not necessarily lead to arrest, prosecution and con-
viction." Large numbers of persons engage in criminal activity but
do not come to the attention of law enforcement authorities. More-
over, committing a crime in the view of the police does not necessarily
5 Allen, Criminal Law and the Fusture, in THE BoRDERL&NA1 OF CRI INIAL JusTICE
123, 126 (1964).
61d. at 125.
7See, e.g., J. SKoLxICK, JUsTIcE Wrraour TRIAL (1966); Goldstein, Police
Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process, 69 YALE LJ. 543 (1960) ; LaFave,
The Police and the Non-Enforcement of the Law, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 104 (1962).
8 According to a recent study of police behavior on skid row, "[plolicemen often
do not arrest persons who have committed minor offenses in circumstances in which
the arrest is technically possible.... [P]olicemen often not only refrain from invoking
the law formally but also employ alternative sanctions. For example, it is standard
practice that violators are warned not to repeat the offense. This often leads to
patrolmen's 'keeping an eye' on certain persons." Bittner, The Police on Skid Row:
A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 Am. Soc. Rnv. 699, 702 (1967).
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make arrest an inevitable consequence.' Variables such as age, race,
demeanor, class, and economic status play a crucial part in determining
whether a law violator is brought to trial.
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court' have
pointed to the lack of criminal defense work in juvenile court and
called for greater access to legal representation for young persons
charged with crimes and delinquent acts. These decisions have pointed
out that the quality of representation may be an important element in
determining guilt or innocence. This article examines how the ideal
of advocacy works in practice in juvenile court and discusses the ways
in which lawyers handle their juvenile clients.
BACKGROUND AND RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY
The first juvenile court was established in 1899 in Chicago, under
the influence of social reformers like Jane Addams and Julia Lathrop,
who enjoyed a national reputation and were instrumental in liberalizing
child welfare policies in other states. There is some dispute about
whether Illinois was the first state to create a special tribunal for
children. It is generally accepted, however, that the Juvenile Court
Act, passed by the Illinois legislature in 1899, was the first official
enactment of its type. It was acknowledged as a model statute by
other states and countries." By 1917, juvenile court legislation had
been passed in all but three states, and by 1932 there were over 600
independent juvenile courts throughout the United States.'
2
The juvenile court system was part of a general movement to take
adolescents out of the criminal law process and to improve programs
for delinquent, dependent, and neglected children. The juvenile court
was described as "one of the greatest advances in child welfare that
has ever occurred," 1 and its services were recommended for con-
sideration as "an integral part of total welfare planning." '4 The
juvenile court may be defined broadly as a special tribunal created by
statute to determine the legal status of children and adolescents.
Underlying the juvenile court movement was the concept of parens
patriae under which the courts were given wide discretion by the state
9 See Pilliavin & Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 AM. J. Soc. 206
(1964).
1 0 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) ; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"1 Bates, Digest of Statutes Relating to Juvenile Courts and Probation Systems,
13 CHARrrms 329 (1905).
12 Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function
and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7 (1965).
13 Chute, The Juvenile Court in Retrospect, 13 FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1949, at 3, 7.
14 Dobbs, In Defense of Juvenile Courts, 13 FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1949, at 24, 29.
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to handle the problems of "its least fortunate junior citizens." "5 The
administration of juvenile justice differs in many formal respects
from criminal court processes. Technically, a child is not accused of a
crime but is offered care and guidance; judicial intervention in a
child's life supposedly does not carry the stigma of criminal guilt.
Juvenile court records generally are not available to the press or to the
public, and hearings are conducted in relative privacy. Until recently,
the specific safeguards of due process were not applicable in juvenile
court.1
6
The juvenile court was perceived by its supporters not as a
revolutionary experiment, but rather as the culmination of traditionally
valued practices.17  The child welfare movement was anti-legal in the
sense that it minimized the importance of civil rights and procedural
formality, while relying extensively on extra-legal resources. Juvenile
court judges were empowered to investigate the character and social
life of pre-delinquent as well as delinquent children. The judges ex-
amined motivation rather than intent in order to determine the crim-
inality of youthful conduct. They were concerned not simply with
specific criminal acts but with the criminal tendencies of defendants.'"
The tenets of preventive penology justified the court's intervention in
cases where no offense had actually been committed but where, for
example, a child was posing problems for some person in authority such
as a policeman, a teacher, or a social worker.' 9 The unique character
of the juvenile court movement was its concern for pre-delinquent
youth-"children who occupy the debatable ground between criminality
and innocence"-and its claim that it could transform likely criminals
into respectable citizens by training them in "habits of industry, self-
control and obedience to the law." 20
The juvenile court movement embodied more than a concern for
special treatment of adolescent offenders. It brought within the ambit
of governmental control a set of youthful activities that previously
had been ignored or dealt with on an informal basis.2 ' In recent
years, the welfare character of the juvenile court system has come
under attack from lawyers and academics who propose constitutionalist
:5 Schramm, The Juvenile Court Idea, 13 FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1949, at 19, 21.
I' Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. RE.v. 547 (1957);
Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 281 (1967).
17 "The primary function of the reform movement is probably not so much the
bringing about of social change, as it is to reaffirm the ideal values in a given society."
Blumer, Collective Behavior, in PRINCIPLES OF SocIorOY 212-13 (A. Lee ed. 1963).
-8 P. YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY 53 (1962).
19 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §702-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967), quoted in
note 55 infra.
20 ILT. BD. OF STATE COMZ'RS or PUBLIC CHiArrEs, SIXTH BIENNIAL REPORT
104 (1880).
21 See A. PL TAr, THE CH.D SAvERs: THE IxvENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1968).
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or revisionist reforms. Advocates of constitutionalist reforms are
skeptical of the courts' humanitarian goals and are particularly con-
cerned about the invasion of personal rights under the pretexts of
"welfare" and "rehabilitation." 22 It is argued that "[t]he court . . .
is not simply a laboratory or a clinic and the tendency to conceive of
it in these terms, largely to the exclusion of the other function it is
called upon to perform, contributes neither to a sound understanding
of the institution nor to its proper use in serving the public interest." 23
In support of their criticism of the administration of juvenile
justice, the constitutionalists have drawn upon a variety of studies in
social science. The evidence from these studies suggests that the
publicized goals of the juvenile court are rarely achieved. Informal
procedures and confidentiality in juvenile court do not necessarily guard
juveniles against "degradation ceremonies." 2 4 The juvenile court,
despite any intention to understand and adjust juvenile problems, is
structurally organized to make judgments about social behavior.
Juvenile justice is administered by a politically constituted authority
which deals with juvenile conduct through the threat of coercion.
Judicial sanctions can be imposed in the case of either contrary conduct
or contrary attitudes, for the juvenile court is empowered to demand
certain forms of moral propriety and attitudinal responses, even without
a social victim who is visible and suffering.'Despite attempts to purge the term "juvenile delinquent" of
pejorative implications, it has come to have as much dramatic signif-
icance for community disapproval as the label-"criminal"-which
it replaced. The informal system of communication between school,
social agency and parents operates to disseminate the stigma throughout
the adolescent's social world, thus identifying him as a "delinquent,"
"troublemaker" and "problem child." The benevolent philosophy of
22The constitutionalist literature is too vast to be completely cited, but the most
significant contributions include THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JusTicE 43-61
(F. Allen ed. 1964) ; INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, CHILDREN IN THE
CouRTs: THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATON (G. Newman ed. 1957); P. TAPPAN,
DELINQUET GIm, s IN COURT (1947); Beemsterboer, The Juvenile Court-Beitevo-
lence in the Star Chamber, 50 J. CRIM. L.C.&P.S. 464 (1960); Caldwell, The Juvenile
Court: Its Development and Some Major Problems, 51 J. CRiM. L.C.&P.S. 493 (1961) ;
Diana, The Rights of Juvenile Delinquents: An Appraisal of Court Procedures, 47
J. CRIm. L.C.&P.S. 561 (1957); Handler, supra note 12; Nunberg, Problems in the
Structure of the Juvenile Court, 48 J. CRIm. L.C.&P.S. 500 (1958); Paulsen, supra
note 16; Rubin, Protecting the Child in the Juvenile Court, 43 J. CRIM. L.C.&P.S.
425 (1952) ; Yablonsky, The Role of Law and Social Sciece in the Juvenile Court,
53 J. CRIM. L.C.&P.S. 426 (1962); Comment, Juvenile Justice in Transition, 14
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1144 (1967) ; Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts,
supra note 16.
23 F. Allen, The Juvenile Court and the Limits of Juvenile Justice, in THE
BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 61 (F. Allen ed. 1964).
24 Garfinkel, Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 Am. J. Soc. 420 (1956).
25 For the theoretical and policy implications of victimless crime, see E. ScHUR,
CRIMs WITHOUT Victims (1965).
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the juvenile court often disguises the fact that the offender is regarded
as a "non-person" who is immature, unworldly, and incapable of
making effective decisions about his own welfare and future. Genuine
attention is rarely paid to how the offender feels and experiences his
predicament; according to Elliot Studt, the present structural arrange-
ment of the juvenile court is likely to invite regression and diminish
self-respect in its youthful charges. 6  David Matza points to the
"sense of injustice" which is experienced by many adolescents when
they are treated with condescension, inconsistency, hypocrisy, favoritism
or whimsy. 7 Other writers have confirmed that authoritarian pro-
fessionalism and pious intimacy in a court room setting are not con-
ducive to trusting and cooperative relationships." Finally, the con-
stitutionalists argue that juvenile corrective institutions are no better,
and in some cases worse, than adult prisons. On utilitarian grounds
alone, reformatories are a dismal failure in deterring future criminal
behavior2
The essence of the constitutionalist argument is that the juvenile
court system violates constitutional guarantees of due process and
stigmatizes adolescents as "delinquents," thereby performing func-
tions similar to those of the criminal courts. The United States
Supreme Court recognized the elements of this argument for the first
time in 1967 when it delivered an opinion on the constitutionality of
juvenile courts.3" The Court added clear procedural guidelines to its
earlier statement that the "admonition to function in a 'parental' rela-
tionship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness." " Speaking
for the majority in Gault, Justice Fortas said that juveniles are
entitled to (1) timely notice of the specific charges against them,
(2) notification of the right to be represented by counsel in proceedings
which "may result in commitment to an institution in which the
juvenile's freedom is curtailed," 2 (3) the right to confront and cross-
26 Studt, The Client's Imge of the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD
200 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
27 D. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 136 (1964).
28 Handler, mupra note 12, at 20-21.
29 McKay, Report on the Criminal Careers of Male Delinquents il Chicago, in
PRESIDENT'S COMI'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 107 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
SOSee In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
31 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the
child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postu-
lated for children.
Id. at 556.
32Il re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
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examine complainants and other witnesses, and (4) adequate warning
of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to remain
silent. Justice Fortas reflected the constitutionalist argument in stating
that "however euphemistic the title, a 'receiving home' or an 'industrial
school' for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child
is incarcerated . . . .Under our Constitution, the condition of being
a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." "
The right to counsel was the fundamental issue in Gault because
exercise of the right assures procedural regularity and the implementa-
tion of related principles:
A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will
be found to be "delinquent" and subjected to the loss of his
liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony
prosecution. The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to
cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the
facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to
ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and
submit it.3
The Gault decision came shortly after the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice had made strong
recommendations concerning the right to counsel:
[C]ounsel must be appointed where it can be shown that
failure to do so would prejudice the rights of the person
involved . . . .3
Nor does reason appear for the argument that counsel
should be provided in some situations but not in others; in
delinquency proceedings, for example, but not in neglect.
Wherever coercive action is a possibility, the presence of
counsel is imperative ... -o
Counsel should be appointed . . .without requiring any
affirmative choice by child or parent.
37
Although the New York Times greeted Gault as a landmark de-
cision requiring "radical changes," " it seems unlikely that the
decision will generate anything more than a few modest alterations in
the total juvenile court system. Important structural changes will




TASK FORCE REPORT 31.
36 Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
37 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 87 (1967).
38 N.Y. Times, May 16, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
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forthcoming. In the early 1960's, New York, California, and Illinois
passed new juvenile court acts which, according to juvenile court
administrators from these states, anticipated the Supreme Court
decision. Commenting on Gault, judges in New York said that the
"ruling would not affect juvenile cases, since it already is the law." "
Similar pronouncements were made in San Francisco and Chicago.
New York introduced legal counsel to family court through the "law
guardians" system in 1962, and the Public Defender's Office in Chicago
assigned a full-time lawyer to juvenile court early in 1966. The
Gault opinion was no surprise to juvenile court administrators in
these cities.
Not much is yet known about how the new "legalized" juvenile
courts are working, but some information is available concerning the
role of the lawyer in juvenile court. Because much of the constitu-
tionalist argument relies on the effectiveness of legal representation,"
it is worthwhile to examine the probable impact of counsel in juvenile
court. Before the enactment of the New York Family Court Act in
1962, a study discovered that 92 per cent of juvenile respondents in
New York were not represented by counsel.4 A similar inquiry in
California found that "in most counties attorneys are present in 1%o or
less of the juvenile court cases." Another study, based on a national
survey of juvenile court judges in 1964, found that "in most courts
lawyers represent children in less than 5% of the cases which go to
hearing." '
Edwin Lemert recently studied the effects of the 1961 California
Juvenile Court Act and found that the percentage of cases in which
counsel appeared more than trebled in four years, the median rising
from three to ten per cent.' "The evidence is impressive," writes
Lemert, "that representation by counsel more often secures a favorable
outcome of the case than where there is no counsel. Proportionally,
dismissals were ordered nearly three times as frequently in attorney as
in nonattorney cases." " Closer analysis of the data, however, shows
that attorneys were most successful in neglect cases and had almost no
impact on delinquency cases. In fact, in one of the counties studied,
39 Id.
40 See Skoler & Tenney, Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court, 4 J. FAm. L.
77 (1964).
41 Schinitsky, The Role of the Lawyer in Childrens Court, 17 REcoRD op
N.Y.C.B.A. 10, 15 (1962).
42 TAsK FORCE REPORT 32.
45 Skoler & Tenney, supra note 40, at 81.
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juveniles without attorneys were less likely to be detained while await-
ing trial.46
CHICAGO'S JUVENILE COURT
Following the New York and California juvenile court reforms,
the Illinois legislature approved a Juvenile Court Act (1965) which
authorized various procedural and jurisdictional changes."' Although
proceedings under that act were "not intended to be adversary in
character," 4 practical considerations virtually guaranteed that juvenile
court would assume many of the characteristics of a minor criminal
court. The state of Illinois is represented in juvenile court by the
state attorney's office. Correspondingly, juveniles have the right to
be represented by either private or court-appointed counsel. About a
year before the Gault case was decided, the Cook County Public
Defender assigned a full-time lawyer to juvenile court, and the Legal
Aid Bureau established a special office, staffed by two full-time attorneys
and a social worker, across the street from juvenile court.
The Cook County Juvenile Court building is located on Chicago's
west side, about a fifteen-minute drive from downtown. The building
contains seven courtrooms which function every weekday from 9:30
a.m. until the middle of the afternoon. Six judges and magistrates,
plus the presiding judge, who acts mostly in the capacity of adminis-
trative director, handle over 50,000 hearings annually.
In 1966, nearly 17,000 juveniles were referred to this court for
alleged delinquency and related offenses.4' Almost 25 per cent of these
cases were adjusted by administrative officers in the complaint depart-
ment and were not referred to the courts, either because there was in-
sufficient evidence or because the charges were considered trivial."0
Lawyers have the right to represent clients at any administrative or
judicial hearing-complaint hearing, detention hearing,' adjudication
46 Id. at 443.
47 ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-1 to 708-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
48 Id. ch. 37, § 701-20(1).
49 1966 CooK COUNTY Juv. CT. STATISTICAL REPORT.
50The statutory authority for this adjustment procedure is ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 37, § 703-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967) :
The Court may authorize the probation officer to confer in a preliminary
conference with any person seeking to file a petition . .. ,the prospective re-
spondents and other interested persons concerning the advisability of filing
the petition, with a view to adjusting suitable cases without the filing of a
petition.
Adjustment may take the form of referral to the Youth Division of the Police Depart-
ment or a local social agency. A case can be adjusted at the police station without
any contact whatsoever with juvenile court. An adjustment becomes part of a
juvenile's police record and is used in court as an indicator of delinquent character.
61 "Unless sooner released, a minor taken into temporary custody must be brought
before a judicial officer within 24 hours, exclusive of Sundays and legal holidays, for
a detention hearing to determine whether he shall be further detained" pending the
adjudication hearing. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
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hearing, 2 or disposition hearing 5 -- but are most likely to appear at
an adjudication hearing, where guilt or innocence is judged. In 1966,
the Cook County juvenile court officially disposed of nearly 9,000
delinquency cases, of which 22 per cent were dismissed, 15 per cent
resulted in commitment to penal institutions, and 33 per cent received
probation.54
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE
We shall restrict our observations to the role played by attorneys
representing juveniles charged with delinquency or related offenses
such as incorrigibility or truancy.r5 Interviewing and participant ob-
servation were the main research techniques used. The interview
sample was derived from questionnaires and letters mailed to every
attorney who, during 1966, filed an appearance for a delinquency pro-
ceeding in Cook County's juvenile court in Chicago. 6 This is the
latest full year for which these records are available, and also the first
full year in which the 1965 Illinois Juvenile Court Act was implemented.
Addresses were found for 236 attorneys; questionnaires were mailed
to 180 attorneys in the downtown Loop area and to fifty-six with
offices in the suburbs or outlying areas of the city. A total of sixty-two
questionnaires were returned, of which forty indicated that the re-
spondent had represented a client in juvenile court. 7  Of the fifty-one
52 "At the adjudicatory hearing, the court shall first consider only the question
whether the minor is [a delinquent].... For this purpose the rules of evidence in the
nature of civil proceedings . . . are applicable. No finding [that the minor is a de-
linquent] may be made . . .unless supported by a preponderance of the evidence nor
may such finding be based solely upon the uncorroborated extra-judicial admission or
extra-judicial confession of the minor." Id. § 704-6.
M3 "After adjudging the minor a ward of the court, the court shall hear evidence
on the question of the proper disposition best serving the interests of the minor and
the public." Id. § 703-5.
64 The remaining 30% of the cases were continued until the next year or disposed
of through unaccounted official action. 1966 Coox CouNTy Juv. CT. STATISTICAL REP.
65 "Those who are delinquent include (a) any boy who prior to his 17th birthday
or a girl who prior to her 18th birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regard-
less of where the act occurred, any federal or state law or municipal ordinance; and
(b) any minor who has violated a lawful court order made under this act." ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 37, § 702-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967). "Those otherwise in need of super-
vision include (a) any minor under 18 years of age who is beyond the control of his
parents, guardian or other custodian; and (b) any minor subject to compulsory
school attendance who is habitually truant from school. . . ." Id. § 702-03.
66 We found the names of these attorneys in a ledger in the clerk's office at
juvenile court. It has been pointed out to us, however, that lawyers do not always
sign this ledger when they file an appearance. It is estimated that between 5% and
10% of the total number of appearances by private attorneys are not accounted for
in our sample.
57 A follow-up of errant questionnaires showed that some never reached their
destination because they were wrongly addressed (ledger signatures were misread)
or because attorneys had changed their address and could not be traced.
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attorneys who were personally contacted and interviewed, sixteen had
not responded to the questionnaire, but they did not differ in any
significant respect from the thirty-five who did respond. 8
In addition to the time spent interviewing attorneys, hundreds
of hours were spent in observing juvenile court practices over a period
of twelve months. Informal discussions were held with personnel
of Cook County's juvenile court-the chief judge, the director of social
services, judges, magistrates, and probation officers. Considerable time
was spent in observing the juvenile court's Public Defender at work.
Lawyers from other service organizations in Chicago were interviewed
and observed on the job.
Of the 13,605 attorneys listed in 1966 as practicing in Cook
County, 333 (2.5 per cent) filed appearances in juvenile court. These
333 attorneys appeared at over 570 hearings on behalf of clients
charged with being a delinquent or a minor in need of supervision
(MINS). Of the fifty-one lawyers interviewed for this study, forty-one
have offices in the downtown business district and ten are Negroes
who practice on Chicago's southside. Twenty of the forty-one are in
practice on their own, thirteen are in small firms (two to four partners),
five belong to medium-sized firms (five to fourteen partners), and three
are members of large firms (fourteen to seventeen partners).59
Lawyers in the upper echelons of their profession come into
contact with juvenile court by accident only. Corporate lawyers and
influential trial lawyers have little interest in the minor criminal courts.
One lawyer from a large firm handled a case as a favor to a relative
and never expected to see juvenile court again: "I don't care for this
type of law. I don't have the energy or facilities to handle it, and
would always refuse unless, like this, it was a special favor." (14) 60
Another lawyer retained by a large department store came to juvenile
court on behalf of the son of the president's chauffeur. A young mem-
ber of a large LaSalle Street firm found that one appearance in juvenile
court was sufficient for him:
I don't know what they are trying to do or how they are
doing it. . . . If I knew what was going on there I might
like it, but now it is a mystery to me. I don't understand the
5 8 Those who did not respond to the questionnaire were similar to those who did
respond in terms of (a) size of office, (b) type of practice, and (c) level of experi-
ence with juvenile court.
69 The total number of attorneys listed in Cook County is taken from 1965-66
SULLIVAN's LAW DIREcroRY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS. The small firms differ from
individual practices only in terms of specialization and pay arrangements. Office
sharing among numerous lawyers was distinguished from true partnership arrange-
ments in large firms.
60 Each number in parentheses refers to a particular interviewee.
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proceedings and I don't know what opportunities are available
for disposition. (17)
Of the five members of medium-sized firms, two had handled only
one juvenile case each in their careers. Both got their clients dismissed,
charged a substantial fee ($75 and $200)-though not as much as
they would have charged for an adult-and were satisfied with the
way their cases were handled by juvenile court. Both said that they
would not mind representing a juvenile again but doubted if they
would ever work with another one. A third lawyer from a medium-
sized firm had handled only dependency cases in juvenile court. The
two other attorneys from such firms took juvenile cases as a favor to
a relative and an important client, respectively, but would decline to
represent juveniles in the future.
It is safe to conclude that the most prominent and wealthy mem-
bers of the bar are not the ones representing juvenile clients. Juvenile
cases are given even lower priority than traffic or misdemeanor cases.
One lawyer complained to his friends at the office about the lack of
clients: "The only business we turn away is juvenile business." (1)
This is not to suggest that the members of prestigious firms have no
contact with juvenile clients, but rather that juveniles are not part of
their regular business. The members of these firms are more likely
to help in handling the legal problems of the poor through voluntary
and charitable arrangements on a corporate basis. Such arrangements
usually do not benefit juveniles, although there are exceptions. Be-
tween 1963 and 1965, fifty members of the Woman's Bar Association
pioneered a volunteer program in juvenile court by agreeing to represent
any indigent juvenile who was referred to them by the chief probation
officer. In actuality, fifteen lawyers carried the bulk of the work, and
they were only called upon in emergency situations. With the new
Juvenile Court Act of 1965 and the assignment of OEO funds to the
Chicago Legal Aid Bureau, the Woman's Bar Association program
was discontinued.V '
Another voluntary service is provided by the Church Federation
of Greater Chicago, which sponsors legal advice clinics in thirty-three
centers throughout the city and suburbs. Members of large law firms
have agreed to volunteer one night every month to man these neighbor-
hood clinics. The Neighborhood Legal Assistance Center provides a
full range of legal services at a location on the near north side of
Chicago. Initiated by lawyers from a large firm and funded partly by
the federal government, the NLAC has so far found that it rarely gets
61 Interview with Mrs. Esther Rothstein, past chairman of the Woman's Bar
Association Committee on the Juvenile Court, June 23, 1967.
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juvenile cases.6" The burden of juvenile representation has fallen upon
the Public Defender's Office and the Legal Aid Bureau, both of which
rely on governmental funds (county and federal, respectively) and
have close institutional ties with the court system. Prior to the recent
governmental funding of legal programs for the poor, some lawyers
from influential firms donated time and money on a voluntary basis.
Now, however, most of these lawyers come into contact with juvenile
court only as a favor to a friend or an influential client. With the
expansion of public defender and legal aid programs, members of large
law firms have less and less to do with the legal problems of poor people.
PRIVATE LAWYERS AS OUTSIDERS IN JUVENILE COURT
Over eighty per cent of the lawyers interviewed may be defined as
"small-fee lawyers"-lawyers who have solo practices, are general
practitioners, and do predominantly trial work.' The small-fee lawyer
has a marginal status in the legal profession. He is excluded from
participation in influential firms and from positions of power in
established bar associations. With no money to buy a partnership and
with a degree from a poorly-regarded law school,' he is forced to
handle the bar's dirty work. According to Jerome Carlin's study of
individual practitioner's in Chicago:
For most individual practitioners, getting started on their
own was a hard, uphill struggle. Their work in the early
years consisted generally of the dregs of legal practice and
their income was correspondingly meager. The matters they
handled were with few exceptions the least desirable from
every point of view: the marginal cases, the cases no one else
wanted, the cases involving the least return and the most
aggravation. . . . The most distinguishing feature of such
cases is their petty character-the small amount -of money
involved, the tenuousness of the claim (or its nonexistence)-
and the inordinate amount of time required to make any
62 The thirty volunteer lawyers in NLAC are regularly employed by firms which
do not handle cases in criminal law, domestic relations, or personal injury-the three
fields which most directly affect poor people. All of the participating lawyers are in
the upper echelons of their profession; all are in prestige firms and none is in private
practice. Of the original nine founding members, six went to Harvard Law School,
one to Yale and one to Chicago. In the first two years of operation, according to its
director, NLAC did not handle one juvenile case.
63 This typology is adapted from A. Wooo, CRImrNA. LAwYER 40-46 (1967).
See also Ladinsky, Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice, and Legal Institutions, 28 Am.
Soc. REv. 47-54 (1963).
4According to Jerome Carlin and Jan Howard, "lawyers representing lower-
class persons tend to be the least competent members of the bar, and those least likely
to employ a high level or wide range of technical services." Carlin & Howard, Legal
Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 381, 384 (1965). We cannot
agree with the judgment that the "best" lawyers are the ones with the most academic
training from a "top quality law school." A degree from a night law school may be
more useful to a lawyer who regularly practices in criminal court.
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headway at all. In short, such practice constitutes the dirty
work, the "crap," the "junk" that no one else will handle,
but which the younger lawyer will often have to take if he
wants any business at all. 5
Like most small-fee work, juvenile cases are rarely profitable, and
the effort they require often seems out of proportion to the seriousness
of the case, the fee, and the good that can be accomplished. In our
interview sample, twelve lawyers did not receive any payment, seven
were paid in full, and thirty-two received what they considered a
minimal fee."0 The small-fee lawyers accepted juveniles as clients in
the regular course of their business, whereas the others accepted
juveniles only for exceptional reasons: as part of a political obligation,
as a personal favor for a friend or relative, in exchange for a promise
of more lucrative business, or as part of family service for a regular
client.
The small-fee lawyer, as Carlin has pointed out, "is most likely to
be found at the margin of his profession, enjoying little freedom in
choice of clients, type of work, or conditions of practice." 17 Tort
suits, title searching, small claims, matrimonial and criminal law make
up his routine business. Most petty criminal defense work requires
minimal skills of advocacy and oratory, but demands salesmanship,
adaptability, an affable demeanor and personality-in effect, all the
qualities of a small-time entrepreneur. The clients of small-fee lawyers
typically are from low income groups and, in criminal cases, charged
with misdemeanors rather than felonies. It has been observed that
middle income persons use the services of a lawyer more often than
the poor and that this reflects class inequalities in the administration
of justice."8 But it is worthwhile to note that poor persons seek and
receive legal advice from persons other than lawyers. Social workers,
clergymen, precinct captains, ward committeemen, policemen, jailhouse
lawyers, bondsmen, clerks and bailiffs also possess entrepreneurial
competence and have access to the judicial system. The practices of
these non-legal advisors determine to some extent the procedures which
lawyers must follow in juvenile court.
6jJ. CAR.IN, LAWYERs ON THEm OwN 13-14 (1962).
06The following represents a sample of the fees charged: $500 (1), $350 (1),
$250 (3), $200 (1), $100 (4), $50 (6), $25 (8).
67 J. CAR.N, supra note 65, at 206.
68 See J. CARLIN, supra note 65; NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW AND POVERTY,
LAW AND POVERTY 1965 (1965); Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian
Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964).; Carlin & Howard, supra note 64; Carlin,
Howard & Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor: Issues for Sociological Research,
1 L. & Soc'y REV. 9 (1966) ; Skolnick, The Sociology of Law in America: Overview
and Trends, 12 SocI.. PROBLEMS 4 (Summer Supp. 1965).
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Most small-fee lawyers do a cash business, and it is difficult to
estimate how much they make from criminal defense work. What
money they do manage to earn from this type of practice appears to be
extracted from clients who are officially poor. 9 Many persons who
are marginally or even officially poor prefer to scrape together a token
fee raiher than accept the free services of a court-appointed lawyer.7°
The small-fee lawyer operates under many of the same conditions as
a small businessman. He must be prepared to accept a down payment
on a fee and to extend credit in the hope that a satisfied client or a
relative later will pay him in full. A defendant who is capable of
raising $50 to $100 for bail is always a good risk because his lawyer
can collect his fee out of the bail money.71 Pawnshops and loan com-
panies facilitate the practice of credit payments, and it is not unusual
for a lawyer to receive payment in kind (for example, a watch or piece
of jewelry). Another form of "payment" is the referral of paying
clients, a practice which may ultimately provide a regular income for
small-fee lawyers.
Although juvenile court is like a minor criminal court in terms
of the imputed criminal character of its clientele and the availability of
penal sanctions, its organizational and administrative routines differ
from those of criminal court in at least three pertinent respects:
(1) Bail arrangements represent a significant activity for the
lawyer in criminal court. Bail money is often accepted as a down
payment on a fee; the bondsman plays an important role in referring
clients to lawyers, and the bonding process facilitates informal relation-
ships within the court system. However, the Illinois Juvenile Court
Act makes no provision for bail, although a defendant can be released
to his parents pending the adjudication hearing if he is not an "im-
mediate and urgent" danger to himself or others.7" No bond money
6 Definitions of official poverty vary, but it may be assessed in terms of income
(e.g., below $3,000 per annum), or welfare status (e.g., receiving aid to dependent
children funds or living in public housing).
7 0 Even juveniles are reluctant to use public attorneys. According to one
seventeen-year-old youth:
You always got to have a lawyer. I would never take one of those public
defenders because they work for the city .... They sit down with the judge
and they got this piece of paper and they talk it over and decide what this
nigger's gonna get. Whether he's gonna get six months or less. The cat
don't talk to you till you come in. They bring you in from the bullpen and
you're standing in court in front of the judge and he kind of puts his hand
over his mouth and whispers sideways to you "What happened? How do you
plead?" And you tell him in three minutes and then he goes on and gets you
busted. So I would never take no public defender, because those ofays down
there in court just want to put you away.
71 A lawyer can accompany his client to the bond office and, for a small "fee" to
a bond clerk, the check is handed over (rather than mailed) to the client, who en-
dorses it to the lawyer.72 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 703-4, 703-6(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
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is required in this proceeding and there is no need for a lawyer to
bargain for lower bond or to help his client raise the required amount.
A lawyer's job at this stage of a case is to present evidence and char-
acter witnesses in order to convince the court that the defendant may
be safely released to his parents' custody. There is no commercialism
or profit in juvenile court bonding procedures, and the bondsman has
no function there.
(2) The American system of criminal justice, as Jerome Skolnick
has pointed out, is predominantly pre-trial in character; full-scale trials
reflect a breakdown of negotiations between the defense and prosecuting
attorneys.73  Something like 90 per cent of all convictions in lower
criminal courts are the result of a negotiated plea or deal.74 Rules of
evidence are routinely ignored or bypassed and advocacy is sub-
ordinated to what Abraham Blumberg has called "bureaucratically
ordained and controlled 'work crimes,' short cuts, deviations, and out-
right rule violations. . . . The 'trial' becomes a perfunctory reiteration
and validation of the pretrial interrogation and investigation." 75 The
small-fee lawyer, according to Skolnick, is typically a cooperative agent
of the criminal court system rather than an independent ally of
defendants:
It is rare . . . for the average local defense attorney to base
his strategy of defense on procedural error in the routine
case, whether he is a private attorney or a [public defender].
Most private defense attorneys usually operate on a theory
of defense similar to that of the public defender, and "bargain"
as willingly as he. This theory presupposes the guilt of the
client, as a general matter, and the fact that pleas of guilty
are so common tends to reinforce the presumption of guilt
throughout the system. It is a theory that stresses adminis-
trative regularity over challenge, and emphasizes decisions
most likely to maximize gain and minimize loss in the nega-
tively valued commodity of penal "time." ,7
There are limited opportunities for plea bargaining in juvenile
court, however, because a defendant only can be found guilty of
delinquency, no matter what criminal charge is proved. Nothing is
gained by reducing aggravated battery to assault if the outcome is the
same in both cases. Only two formal punitive dispositions are avail-
73 Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CoNFILIcr REsoLUTION
52, 69-70 (1967).
74 Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Gaine: Organiaational
Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & Sody REv. 15, 18 (1967). See also D. NEWMAN,
CONVICTION: THE D~rERMINATION OF GuILT OR INNOCENCE WrrHOUT TRIAL (1966).
7 Blumberg, sitpra note 74, at 19, 22.
76 Skolnick, stupra note 73, at 62.
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able to juvenile court judges-probation or reformatory." The state's
attorneys cannot make deals about reduced sentences in exchange for
a guilty plea because the sentencing decision is not within their dis-
cretion. The Youth Commission alone, which has no relationship with
the court decision-making process, has the power to release a juvenile.
In theory, the Youth Commission can keep him in a reformatory until
the end of his minority. Even when defense attorneys are present in
juvenile court, plea bargaining is at most a limited operative factor.
(3) Effective criminal defense work depends on the lawyer's
ability to cultivate and maintain informal, reciprocal relationships with
court personnel. The lawyer's dependence on the decisions of govern-
ment officials causes him to develop techniques of cooperation and
bargaining such as political support, deference, "fixing," and general
affability. Informal relationships do not, for the most part, indicate
unethical practices or individual weaknesses. On the contrary, they
emerge from considerations of mutual benefit and harmonious working
conditions for those persons who participate in everyday court affairs.
7 8
It is important for a small-fee lawyer in the criminal courts to be
recognized and appreciated by functionaries such as police, clerks and
bailiffs who can do much to expedite hearings and facilitate access to
state's attorneys and judges. It is difficult to assess what proportion
of cases are influenced by bribes, but it is readily admitted by ex-
perienced criminal lawyers that "fixing" is a typical practice. For
those persons regularly involved in court business, "fixing" takes many
forms and does not usually have immoral connotations. For example,
the payment of two to five dollars to a clerk in order to have a case
quickly called has become an accepted and customary event. Referrals
and fee splitting, especially by policemen, have received less publicity
but are nevertheless common occurrences. The scandals which occa-
sionally expose the illegal activities on the part of judges and prose-
cutors suggest that "fixing" also occurs at the highest level, although
it is more likely to be protected by political immunity.
In contrast, juvenile court hearings are conducted privately in
small courtrooms, and lawyers are not allowed to come and go as they
please.79 Lawyers are rarely given priority in the hearing of cases and
77 There are some other dispositions available, such as supervision by parents or
a guardian, but essentially it is a choice between reformatory and probation. See
note 50 .rpra.
78 A. WooD, suprc note 63, at 134-80.
79 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-20 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967). The chief judge
of the Cook County Juvenile Court recently found it necessary to instruct clerks and
bailiffs that lawyers should be accorded more respect and privileges, consistent with
their position as officers of the court.
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are not accorded any special respect by court functionaries. The
entrances to the juvenile courtrooms in Chicago are policed by at
least two bailiffs, who regulate the flow of cases, inspect credentials,
and neither are offered nor accept payment in return for small favors.
The clerk in juvenile court, in contrast to his counterpart in criminal
court, is not in a position of power or influence; his role is limited to
organizing the court calendar and coordinating records. We have
neither observed nor heard of a decision in juvenile court which was
influenced by "fixing."
It is understandable why the small fee lawyer feels uncomfortable
in a system which does not recognize the informal practices char-
acteristic of his work in other courts. Since it is difficult to maintain
a front of composure and expertise when faced with powerlessness and
loss of status, many lawyers coming to juvenile court for the first time
immediately seek out a contact who can introduce them to the court's
informal practices. The following exchange between a newcomer to
juvenile court (A) and an experienced Legal Aid attorney (B) is
typical of the process:
A's client is a fourteen-year-old white student who was
arrested for possession of marijuana. He admitted buying it
from a friend at the private school from which he was subse-
quently expelled. He told the arresting officer that he knew
what marijuana was but that he did not intend to use it.
The father of the client is a corporate executive known to A
through his practice.
A asked the Legal Aid lawyer what tactics would be
best in juvenile court. B replied: "You have to use an
informal equity approach here. I suggest that you file a
motion to suppress as you've planned but you'd be better to do
it informally and orally. First of all talk about how you know
the family and the boy. .. .. Say that he's never been in
trouble before. In that way, you'll be protected in case he
denies the motion and you won't seem to have taken too
hard a line. If the motion doesn't work, explain that the boy
didn't really know what he was doing and that he will prob-
ably go to Harvard one day. . . . It would be a shame to
have a thing like this go down on his record and ruin his
future career. . . . Say that he's not a criminal type. If
this fails, then ask for a 4-7 [supervision] which will let him
off without a record."
B then took out a copy of the juvenile court act and
showed A the relevant section about supervision. In court,
A stood close to his client, with his arm around the boy's
shoulders even though he had not met him until he took his
case. He gave his informal speech and hinted that he was
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going to present a motion to suppress the policeman's evi-
dence. Without considering the motion, the judge dismissed
the case after A had guaranteed his client's future good
behavior.
Most criminal lawyers, however, do not have probation officers
or Legal Aid lawyers as contacts in juvenile court. They may occa-
sionally know a judge, but rarely the state's attorneys, who usually
come to juvenile court straight out of law school:
I happen to have a good connection with D [a judge]
that I can use and I suppose other lawyers have gradually
developed rapport with others. I sometimes can go in to
see the judge and say, "I have a problem, I don't know
exactly what to do in this case," and he will give me an
idea what will happen. In other courts, you can almost
always talk to the state's attorney first. (59)
They pay no attention to law. I know people there, so
I talk to them and they help me settle my cases, but I don't
act like a lawyer. In this way it is like any other criminal
court. Unless you have a big case, you don't give legal
services but you play the game. (7)
Rather than going for it formal like a hot shot, it's
much better to approach the judge on a psychological basis,
and take a fireside equity approach. Talk to him, tell him
what the situation is, and if your client is guilty say so ...
But if you proceed strictly on the rules of evidence, your
client will be guilty. (50)
Without any contacts in juvenile court, lawyers are denied pref-
erential treatment consistent with their status in other courts. Over
three-quarters of the lawyers interviewed complained that they had to
wait an unreasonable amount of time before their cases were called. It
is quite common for a private lawyer to have to wait two or three
hours, whereas a public defender is granted immediate access as a
member of the court community. Lawyers who are forced to sit
around the Cook County juvenile court building soon become sensitive
to its depressing surroundings and the rows of poor people waiting for
officialdom to intervene in their lives. The hypocrisy of private hear-
ings becomes apparent as juveniles are led in handcuffs through the
public corridors:
Juvenile court is an infested place, like an afterthought.
Anyone who comes near is given bad treatment. (6)
It is depressing. . - . You are always faced with
exhausting emotional arguments amidst crowds and dirt.
(11)
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This initial impression of juvenile court tends to reinforce a
conspiratorial theory of the court's organization. Lawyers feel that
they are not accorded the respect and services typically found in other
courts because juvenile court is controlled by the entrenched interests
of social workers and probation officers 80 ° "I try to get on good terms
with the probation officer," says one small fee lawyer, "because he is
the one who will decide. I suppose other lawyers know them better
and therefore do better." (13) Lawyers variously characterize the
social service staff at juvenile court as naive, powerful, arbitrary, and
influential:
They don't like lawyers in juvenile court, you know.
The social service department runs the place. (19)
My chief suggestion is to bring the juvenile court into
the real world where men fight dirty and bargains are made
on both sides. The do-gooders there are the worst. They
are not in the real world . . . where the kids and cops
are. (21)
This is the only court that generates its own business
through probation officers. Other courts have to wait for a
case to be brought by someone not an officer of the court.
(23)
The social workers are young beatniks who don't inspire
confidence in kids or in me either. They are too flippant.
The kids need to be straightened out by people older and
wiser. (3)
Lawyers are made uncomfortable by the privacy of juvenile court,
where the public is not admitted to hearings. "I suppose there is good
reason but I get the feeling that I am behind closed doors." (28) The
consensus is that juvenile court is a dreary and discouraging place.
Despite the recent emphasis on representation for juveniles, lawyers
feel that their presence in juvenile court is greeted with indifference and
a lack of recognition of their unique skills and status:
The court has no respect for lawyers as lawyers. I go
into court like any other person. The setup is such that the
lawyer is no more distinct in the proceedings than say the
parent or clergyman. (32)
Juvenile court is a terrible place for a lawyer. He is
emasculated by restrictions and feels like a fool. He is one
of many people, all listened to equally. (56) 81
;o Hartman, Trying a Delinquency Case in Juvenile ,Court, 55 ILL. B.J. 294-98
(1966).
81 Some lawyers, however, feel that their presence does make a difference-as it
does in traffic court:
I don't think the judge ever actually listens to what the lawyer has to say,
but he will give the child a break for the sake of the lawyer. I guess the
judge realizes the professional situation. (58)
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DEFENSE STRATEGIES IN JUVENILE COURT
The appropriate role of the lawyer in juvenile court has been
given considerable attention in the literature. Jacob Isaacs, in a recent
study of the New York Family Court, proposed that the juvenile court
lawyer perform the functions of advocate, guardian, and officer of the
court. As advocate, he "must stand as the ardent defender of his
client's constitutional and legal rights;" as guardian, he is required to
have regard for the "general welfare of the minor ;" and as officer of
the court, he "must assume the duty of interpreting the court and its
objectives to both child and parent, of preventing misrepresentation and
perjury in the presentation of facts, [and] of disclosing to the court
all facts in his possession which bear upon a proper disposition of the
matter .... "" Isaacs' tripartite characterization represents an
ideal rather than current reality. Edwin Lemert, in an empirical
study of California juvenile courts, found that adversary tactics are
marginal in relation to "the attorney's function as a negotiator and
interpreter between judge and family." ' The public defender, even
more than a private lawyer, is likely to become "co-opted into the
organization of the court, even becoming its superficial appendage.
Factors encouraging this are the low priority public defenders give to
juvenile work and the growth of inter-departmental or informal
reciprocity with probation officers." '
There is strong pressure from legislatures, judges and legal com-
mentators to repress adversary tactics in juvenile court. The Florida
legislature, for example, has responded to Gault with a provision for
legal representation through the state division of youth services."5 This
provision reinforces the traditional policy of benign paternalism by
assuming that state officials will act in the best interests of young
persons charged with crimes. Most juvenile court judges deny the
importance of adversary trials and "see the lawyer's chief value as
lying in the areas of interpretation of the court's approach and securing
cooperation in the court's disposition rather than the more traditional
roles of fact elicitation and preservation of legal rights." " Thomas
Welch, writing from the constitutionalist perspective, perceives the
attorney as interpreter rather than advocate, because "he is better
8 Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family
Court, 12 BurFALo L. RE-. 501, 506-07 (1963).
83 Lemert, Juvenile Justice-Quest and Reality, 4 T-A.ns-ACrION 30, 40 (1967).
84 Lemert, supra note 44, at 431. This point is also documented in Sudnow,
Norml Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Olce,
12 Soclu.. PROBLE:mS 255-76 (1965).
85 S. 1506, Florida Legislature, June 2, 1967.
86 Skoler & Tenney, supra note 40, at 97.
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situated than anyone to explain the nature and objectives of the juvenile
courts. He should explain that the juvenile is not being tried as a
criminal, the court is not going to punish him, and criminal court
tactics of resistance are not appropriate in juvenile court . .. Above
all, the attorney in a delinquency hearing should discard any personal
interest in winning cases. Where punishment has truly been elim-
inated, real 'victory' is realized when a delinquent has been rehabilitated.
The real 'defeat' lies in obstructing the legitimate operation of the
rehabilitation mechanism." 8
Lawyers in juvenile court are forced to work within a system that
has always preferred informal adjustment over adversary procedures: "8
I avoid being legalistic at all. The rules of evidence are
out of the window ... They operate on an informal basis.
(13)
There I don't use a technical defense but work out a
plan for adjustment with the judge, social worker, and
probation officer. These people attempt to work out a solu-
tion. (51)
It's informal. I wouldn't press an objection here as I
would in another court. The court is willing to reason with
you, to do what all parties think is best. (27)
Although most of the small-fee lawyers complain about the lack of
due process in juvenile court, most admit that in this respect it is not
too different from most lower criminal courts. Complaints about
abuses in juvenile court tend to come from the more successful lawyers
who do not typically make their living from small-fee cases:
A lawyer cannot be sure what he can do, at what point
he can interrogate an investigator or caseworker or policeman
who is testifying. You can't tell what the judge will let you
do. (8)
It isn't a court but a summary administrative hearing.
• . .In effect, everyone who comes before the court is denied
counsel. (29)
I don't care for their procedure. There's not the fair and
impartial trial given to an adult. It's too informal. (18)
Plea bargaining is discouraged in juvenile court, though we have
witnessed several conferences between defense lawyer, state's attorney
and judge where, in return for a plea of guilty, a client has been guar-
87 Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-Fundainental Fairness for the Accused it a
Quasi-Crilminal Forum, 50 MINl. L. REv. 681-82 (1966).
88 "Normative Conflict in a Juvenile Court," paper delivered by Vaughan Staple-
ton at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, July, 1967, at 17.
1968]
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anteed probation or supervision instead of incarceration." Oppor-
tunities for bargaining are formally limited, and most lawyers feel that
it is not worth their effort, since a juvenile is only rarely committed to
a reformatory. A conviction for delinquency, an assignment to pro-
bation, or even a temporary commitment for psychiatric evaluation,
is not considered especially punitive or discrediting:
In a small case on a first offense I might refuse a case
unless the party wants to pay for the half day I have to spend
in court. If it's not too serious the child will just get pro-
bation, attorney or no, and I tell the people this. (3)
The parents ask me what will happen. If it is the first
offense, I always tell them nothing will happen. No one is
sent to the Illinois Youth Commission the first time. I tell
them he will most likely only get a bawling out. (38)
In juvenile court very few boys get sent away. The
judge is interested in frightening them and sending them
home. So I don't really think that's an area in which there
are many infringements of the individual rights of the people
coming there. (50) 90
About one-quarter of the lawyers who have spent some time in
juvenile court think that the court is too lenient with juvenile offenders:
Right now, discipline there is a slap on the hand. The
best deterrent would be to send the bad ones to County Jail.
That's how they would learn. (24)
The court should be more strict on offenders. Punish-
ment should be more of a deterrent . . . . (41)
Since there is no record, I would like to give a child a
taste of being locked up for a while. (41)
The new law has made big shots out of punks, as well as
jamming up the courts and the hardpressed staff. (44)
I think they should make the punishment fit the crime.
A boy who commits armed robbery should be tried for armed
robbery. (57)
Small-fee lawyers do not regard the juvenile court as a punitive organi-
zation. They are well aware that the court lacks the formal procedures
available in other courts, but find this limitation unobjectionable in
89 Cf. text accompanying note 77 supra. "Supervision" means a lengthy continu-
ance during which the client is expected to keep out of trouble. If he is judged to
have done so until the trial date, the case is dismissed. This procedure is similar to
the "sitting out period" used in criminal courts, except that in such cases the defendant
serves "dead time" under the misconception that he is avoiding a record.
90 This opinion is curiously inconsistent with the facts. Lawyers are generally
unaware of the frequency of commitments to penal institutions. The St. Charles
Training School for Boys is hopelessly overcrowded with more than 600 inmates. The
pretrial detention home processed nearly 11,000 juveniles in 1965 and over 1300
juveniles were committed to the Youth Commission facilities in 1966.
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practice. The views of small-fee lawyers about the rights of children
and child-raising techniques differ quite fundamentally from those ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court, academics, and some legislators. Chil-
dren get the same kind of treatment in juvenile court that they get in
school, and small-fee lawyers accept this treatment as an inevitable and
appropriate consequence of adolescence.91
Lawyers apply different standards to juvenile clients because they
are children, not necessarily because the lawyers have been occu-
pationally constrained to accept the court's welfare policies. A lawyer
typically has conscientious reservations about helping a juvenile beat
a case:
I am not as careful to avoid disclosure as I am in an
adult case. I let the facts out as they are. A child must
realize what he did wrong and that he is responsible for the
truth. (37)
If I knew a child was innocent, I would interpose a good
rigorous defense. But this has never happened. I have
gotten cases where a child was not malicious, or not in the
wrong, but never where a child did not participate in the act.
I have no objection to having a client put on probation when
he did something wrong but was not at fault. (3)
I tried to impress him with the difference between right
and wrong, about church and telling the truth and all that.
He denied the charges, but I think he was lying. (5)
I don't resort to the technical defense that often I know
I could raise and perhaps get the child off. My interest is
in whether the youngster can be rehabilitated. If he has
done something wrong, I point this out to the court. The
judges seem to like this approach better. (52)
If a case is won on a technicality, a lawyer feels obliged to personally
warn his juvenile client against the dangers of future misconduct:
I consider it my job to scold and warn the child. I tell
him that the only reason that I have agreed to take the case is
that I believe in him and that he is entitled to one break and
that if he commits one more offense I will drop him. (39)
I would try to put the fear of God in the kid.
Maybe the whole problem should be handled differently.
That is something that weighed heavily on my mind in a
number of cases. It makes you think that you might be
responsible for these boys. I don't feel the same with adults
because I think the imperfection is in the law, not in the
people. (50)
91 According to Bennett Berger, "adolescents are made not by nature but by being
excluded from responsible participation in adult affairs, by being rewarded for de-
pendency, penalized for precocity, 'and so rendered sufficiently irresponsible to confirm
the prevailing teenager-stereotype'." Berger, Book Review, 32 AM. Soc. Rxv. 1021
(1967), quoting F. MusGRoVE, YOUTH AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 16 (1965).
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The following discussion was observed outside a courtroom after a
private lawyer had just won a dismissal for a lower class, white client:
The lawyer told the boy that the victory was meaningless
unless he started to do something with his life: "Have you
thought what you're going to do now? I mean permanently.
Or are you just going to sit around and see what happens ?"
The boy sheepishly replied that he had not thought about his
future. "Don't you think it's about time then?" said the
lawyer. "You could go to trade school or back to high
school." The father was quick to agree with the lawyer:
"He likes money, that's for sure. He ought to do some
planning. He could be a lawyer like you, or a doctor, or
anything." That was not what the lawyer had in mind and
he mentioned the possibility of trade school: "He could be
an auto mechanic or welder." Then the lawyer turned to
the parents and gave some parting advice: "Remember what
I told you about professional help? I still say you two could
benefit from some professional help. In fact I would say it's
a prerequisite to my representing you again." The parents
did not respond at all, the lawyer shrugged his shoulders and
walked away.
Lawyers see it as part of their duty as adults and public officials to
sit down and talk with juveniles "on their own level," to impress them
with the importance of telling the truth, to frighten them away from
committing similar acts in the future, and to "reinforce to the child
what the judge has said." (54) The juvenile client is in turn ex-
pected to show penitence and gratitude-human qualities which are
similarly appreciated by juvenile court judges. The proper response is
sometimes reinforced by reference to cultural or family responsibility.
"If the child is a Negro," said a white attorney, "and if he is bright
and good in school, I tell him that he has an opportunity to help his
race and his family which he ought to use instead of messing up."
(31) 92
92 Claude Brown's autobiography captures the essence of this sinister benevolence
in speaking of criminal court:
When we got to court, the lawyer was already there. He spoke to Dad,
and Dad yes-sirred him all over the place, kept looking kind of scared, and
tried to make the man think he knew what he was talking about. When the
lawyer came over to me and said, "Hello Claude, how are you?" and shook
my hand and smiled, I had the feeling that God had been kicked right out of
heaven and the meek were lost. And when he started talking to me-not
really talking to me, just saying the stupid things that white people say to
little colored boys with a smile on their faces, and the little colored boys are
supposed to smile too-nothing in the world could have made me believe that
cat was on our side. We weren't even people to him, so how the hell was
he going to fight our fight? I wanted to ask Dad why he went and got this
guy, but I knew why. He thought all Jews were smart. I could have gotten
all that shit out of his head. Anybody could see that this cat wasn't so smart.
No, he was just lucky-lucky that the world had dumb niggers like Dad in it.
C. BROWN, MANCHMD IN THE PRoMasED LAND 93 (1965).
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Any attempt at defense tactics is complicated by the unpredicta-
bility of juvenile clients who "have poor memories," "don't remember,"
"don't have the social and intellectual maturity of an adult," are likely
to "blurt out and convict themselves," and easily "spill the beans." A
lawyer is hesitant to put his client on the witness stand because he
is likely to "crack on cross-examination" or "clam up" and convict
himself through silence:
Children are hard to deal with. You talk to them, tell
them not to say anything, and then you spend all your time
worrying that they will blurt out the truth. What do you do
with a child who steals? It isn't any good to say it's wrong.
I don't know. I treat it like any other case because that's
all I know. (2)
A juvenile client poses further special problems of defense because
the whole family is involved in the legal proceeding. Although a lawyer
appears on behalf of a juvenile, he is usually hired by and therefore
responsible to the parents. A juvenile is consulted for factual and
biographical information and instructed how to behave and dress in
court, but others decide what should be done to him:
I am retained by the parent so that I am not only dealing
with . . . my client. (41)
The child . . . reflects the parents' treatment and the
parents either feel too guilty to get involved . . . or suffer
in silence. I also find that parents are hesitant to fight
juvenile cases. They will almost always go along with what
the probation officer suggests. . . . Even when the child is
going to be taken away, the parents often feel the professionals
know what is best. (17)
If I am not going to take a case I talk only to the parent.
I don't talk to the child at all if it sounds like he really doesn't
need a lawyer. (51)
Another thing different [from other courts] is that I am
hired by the parent, not by the child, and so I am bound to do
what the parent wants. Once in a while there is a conflict
of interests, like where the stepfather had his child arrested
for possession of a weapon and the weapon belonged to [the
stepfather]. (53)
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper was to describe the nature and con-
straints of defense work in juvenile court. We found that private
lawyers in juvenile court are typically small-fee practitioners who make
their living from minor criminal and civil matters. The small-fee
lawyer finds that juvenile court has generated its own "system of
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complicity" " which does not encourage the kinds of informal bargain-
ing arrangements that are found in the criminal courts. Although
many of these arrangements are formally condemned by bar association
spokesmen, they are recognized in practice as a legitimate expression
of a lawyer's craft. The lack of such arrangements requires the lawyer
to learn and accept a new role and new techniques.
The occupation of defense lawyer has traditionally involved con-
tractual and reciprocal obligations between client and lawyer. Ideally,
the client brings a fee, trust, dependence and gratitude to the relation-
ship, whereas the lawyer is required to predict the probable outcome
of a case, to perform esoteric services competently, to reinforce the
bargaining strength of a defendant, and to accomplish results which
would not otherwise be achieved without his presence."' But there are
a variety of novel occupational hazards in juvenile court. Juvenile
clients usually bring modest and undependable fees; informal bargain-
ing and negotiated pleas have very little significance; fringe benefits,
such as accessibility to court personnel or priority over defendants with-
out lawyers, are usually denied or erratically provided; and a lawyer
may be faced with a conflict of interest between a client and his parents.
Trial is avoided because the chances of victory are slight. The vague-
ness of delinquency laws, the unpredictability of juveniles as witnesses,
and the difficulty of discrediting the testimony of adult officials make
it unlikely that a case can be won on its merits:
By the time the child has reached the police station he is
hooked. The youth officer types out the statement of what
happened that is admissible as evidence with no other investi-
gation. Often the policeman who wrote the report has no
more admissible evidence than does the judge, but what is
essentially a charge or an allegation becomes a statement of
fact. (23)
The lawyer in juvenile court is faced with performing a new social
role and he has so far handled this task by modifying his expectations
through common-sense experience. It is significant that of the nine
lawyers who said that they enjoy their work in juvenile court, not one
handled a case for an inner-city or Negro youth. Lawyers from in-
fluential firms who represent children from a social background similar
to their own find that juvenile court is a "reasonable place to do
business" because all parties to the case share a common view about
children:
93 Blumberg, rzpra note 74, at 22. The phrase was used by Blumberg to refer to
criminal court.
9 The "personal-service occupation" is analyzed in E. GOFFMAN, Asy.ums
323-86 (1961).
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I've had much success there by being able to propose a
correctional program to the judge that I have worked out
with the parents. For example, I had to represent a girl who
had gotten into a lot of sexual trouble. She was Jewish but
we had her parents send her down to a Catholic farm in
West Virginia. Another time, we sent a boy to military
school. I have been well treated. People down there are
willing to listen. (16)
I have no objection to the policy of doing what is in
the best interests of the child, but I realize that this policy can
best help the kind of client I had-white, middle-class, with
concerned and vigilant parents-the kind of client who will
respond to a scolding. (30)
[W]ealthy children are able to buy their way out by
selling a program. For example, the family of a young
criminal from Winnetka that I know of was able to convince
the court that the boy would be sent to a correctional school,
and the court dropped what were serious charges. The boy
stayed at the school for a few weeks, as long as he was under
court scrutiny, and then left and went back to where he was
before. (23)
Recent judicial and legislative reforms in the juvenile court have
focused on the need for more legal representation and greater emphasis
on the rules of due process. The Supreme Court hopes that these
reforms will be implemented through the efforts of competent, partisan
defense lawyers. Other writers have pointed out that lawyers most
likely will be co-opted into a powerfully entrenched welfare system and
pressured into abdicating their adversary functions in order to
minimize conflict. 5  Our research supports this prediction but also
suggests that small-fee lawyers readily subscribe to a policy of benign
paternalism. We found that a majority of the lawyers-including half
of the Negro attorneys--expressed concern over the independence and
rebellious defiance of youth:
I wouldn't raise technicalities for any child. The chil-
dren are uppity enough as it is, talking back to their parents
not respecting old folks. In the old days, the rule was
whip first and explain later. It might not always have been
fair but the children learned discipline. We need more dis-
cipline, not more rights. (55)
We have observed in this paper that advocacy and formal pro-
cedures play only a minor role in juvenile court. In order to under-
stand how a lawyer behaves when handling juvenile clients, it is
necessary to understand the organizational context of his craft. How
95 See Lemert, supra note 83, and Stapleton, supra note 88.
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a lawyer handles a case in juvenile court will depend not so much on
the objective determination of facts as on his relationship to the court
and his client's family. This is not to suggest that lawyers act im-
properly, but rather that they find it unprofitable to take an adversary
posture in juvenile court. Lawyers share with policemen, judges,
probation officers, teachers and other adult officials the "peculiar occu-
pational task of hectoring and moralizing" 9 juveniles. According to
Erving Goffman, "the necessity of submitting to these lectures is one
of the consequences of committing acts against the community's social
order." " It is widely assumed that juveniles who are referred to
juvenile court must necessarily carry within themselves a psychological
or social impairment. Lawyers feel uneasy about getting a case dis-
missed because they may be contributing to a future criminal career.
Lawyers are likely to relate to their clients in a parental role and to
share a parental pessimism about troublesome youth. Juvenile clients
are regarded even by their lawyers as subordinates and non-persons
who have no competence to understand their own behavior or determine
where their best interests lie.98 Our findings support the conclusion
that private lawyers will not enhance the bargaining power or rights
of young offenders, but will rather help to consolidate their dependent
status.
96E. GOFFmAN, ASYLUMS 366 (1961).
9
7 Id.
98 E. Gonm"., THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LiFE 151-53 (1959).
